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M U S T A P H A  A N D  T H E  H O S T :  
S O M E  R E F L E C T I O N S  O N  I N F E R E N C E S  I N  
R E L I G I O U S  L A N G U A G E  
Hume, in the course of an extended comparison between theism 
and polytheism in his Natural History oJReligion (1757) , relates the 
following anecdote, which he tells for the purpose of showing the 
absurdities which even a learned sect is capable of believing, but 
which may also serve as an illustration of some of the difficulties in- 
volved in the use of religious language: 
A famous general, at that time in the Muscovite service, 
having come to Paris for the recovery of his wounds, brought 
along with him a young Turk, whom he had taken prisoner. 
Some of the doctors of the Sorbonne (who are altogether as 
positive as the dervishes of Constantinople) thinking it a 
pity, that the poor Turk should be damned for want of in- 
struction, solicited Mustapha very hard to turn Christian, 
and promised him for his encouragement, plenty of good 
wine in this world, and paradise irt the next. These allure- 
ments were too powerful to be resisted; and therefore, having 
been well instructed and catechized, he at last agreed to 
receive the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper. 
The priest, however, to make everything sure and solid, still 
continued his instructions and began the next day with the 
usual question, How many Gods are there? None at all, replies 
Benedict; for that was his new name. How! None at all! cries 
the priest. To be sure, said the honest proselyte. You have told 
me all along that there is but one God: And yesterday I eat him. 
Such are the doctrines of our brethren the Catholics. But to 
these doctrines we are so accustomed, that we never wonder 
at them: Though in a future age, it will probably become 
difficult to persuade some nations that any human, two- 
legged creature could ever embrace such principles. And it is 
a thousand to one, but these nations themselves shall have 
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something fully as absurd in their own creed, to which they 
will give a most implicit and most religious assent? 
This aimcdote is typical of Enlightenment sallies against religion 
both in its malicious humor and its exploitation of a foreign per- 
spective to expose familiar absurdities; it also represents a line of 
attack against Christianity and its more paradoxical doctrines that 
has been used since the time of Celsus and that consists in taking 
these paradoxical doctrines literally and showing their absurd conse- 
quences. It is a line of attack that is peculiarly liable to antagonize 
believers, even in those cases when it is used against doctrines such 
as the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist that demand to be 
taken literally. 
Among the several reactions to this line of attack that are pos- 
sible, two will be examined here. The first, and the one intended by 
Hume, is to say: quite right, a foolish and superstitious belief has 
been exposed. The task of a philosophical critique of religious state- 
ments is precisely to expose the confused and misleading claims of 
religion; and Hume has done this in a deft and casual way to a 
doctrine that "is so absurd, that it eludes the force of all argument. ''~ 
It may be admitted that Hume has settled on a particularly easy 
instance, easy both because of the fact that, for reasons of earlier 
religious history, transubstantiation was regarded in England as a 
particularly foreign and absurd doctrine and also because of the 
fact that the identification of the consecrated host or wafer with the 
body of Jesus Christ can be seen to be false even before its conse- 
quences are spelled out. In fact, the error and absurdity of Catholic 
doctrine on this point have been obvious ever since the beginning 
of Christianity; Jesus' own disciples remark after the discourse on 
faith and the Eucharist in chapter 6 of John, "This is a hard saying; 
who can listen to it?" (John 6.6o) 
Hume himself seems to feel the need to account for the ability of 
men of sense and learning to believe absurdities so manifest, and he 
does so in the following description of the state of mind of believers 
irt popular religion: 
1 David  I tume ,  The Natural History of Religion, in Essays: Moral, Political, andLiterary, ed. 
T.  H. Green and  T.  H. Grose (London:  Longmans ,  Green, i912), II ,  343-344- 
2 Ibid., p. 343- 
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We may observe that, notwithstanding the dogmatical, im- 
perious style of all superstition, the conviction of the reli- 
gionists, in all ages, is more affected than real, and scarcely 
ever approaches, in any degree, to that solid belief and per- 
suasion, which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men 
dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts which 
they entertain on such subjects: They make a merit of im- 
plicit faith; and disguise to themselves their real infidelity, 
by the strongest asseverations and most positive bigotry. But 
nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and suffers not 
the obscure, glimmering light, afforded in those shadowy 
regions, to equal the strong impressions, made by common 
sense and by experience. The usual course of men's conduct 
belies their words, and shows, that their assent in these mat- 
ters is some unaccountable operation of the mind between 
disbelief and conviction, but  approaching much nearer to 
the former than to the latter. 3 
Hume  here attributes the reiteratiort of dubious and even absurd 
beliefs to a confused state of mind, which expresses neither war- 
ranted assent (which, in his view, would be impossible) nor open 
denial (which would resolve the problem simply and expeditiously), 
but  simply reaffirms the absurdity more vehemently. Hume's  treat- 
ment of this condition in the remainder of this section of the Natural 
History o f  Religion makes it clear that he regards the explicitation and 
systematization of religious beliefs as likely to undo this wavering 
state of mind by exposing more clearly the contradictions involved 
in popular religious beliefs. 4 In view, however, of his general pessi- 
mism about  the readiness of most men to strive for truth and con- 
sistency in their beliefs, Hume  would not be greatly surprised by the 
failure of modern Catholics to abandon the doctrine of transub- 
stantiation or by the persistence of religious absurdities in general. 
The second response, and one more likely to commend itself to 
the orthodox apologist, would be to accuse Hume of having mis- 
understood the language of faith. Obviously, the Catholic does not 
believe that he can consume his God. In fact, as another story 
Ibid., pp. 347-348 . 
, Ibid., p. 352. 
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related by H u m e  about  the Eucharist  makes plain, 5 believers regard 
an empiricist literalism as a laughable misunderstanding of  the doc- 
trine of the real presence. The  notion of t ransubstant iat ion itself is a 
metaphysical  effort precisely to avoid the empirical absurdities re- 
sulting from a literal identification of the consecrated wafer with the 
body of Christ. I t  is clear that  the literalist is confusing two separate 
languages : the language of faith, which asserts that  Christ is bodily 
present in the host, and ordinary language, which regards the 
host as a piece of  bread (to which symbolic significance m a y  be 
at tached).  
Confusion of these disparate languages occurs both in superstition, 
when  literal consequences are d rawn from the propositions of  faith 
and  are then affirmed, and in rationalist criticism, in which the 
same consequences are d rawn but  are then used to discredit the 
original affirmations of  faith. In  both cases, there is a common 
failure to grasp the rules and the inner logic of the religious lan- 
guage in question; and there is an insertion of inferences drawn 
from an inappropriate  language. 
In the case under  consideration, the issues involved m a y  be clari- 
fied by convert ing Hume ' s  anecdote into a series of  statements: 
I. Mus tapha  ate a consecrated host. 
2. A consecrated host is the body of Christ. 
3. Christ is God. 
4. An object that  is eaten is consumed, i.e., it ceases to exist as a 
separate object. 
5. There  is one and only one God. 
6. God is an object tha t  can not be consumed. 
7- God is an object that  can not  be eaten. 
8. Mus tapha  ate God. 
9. Mus tapha  ate an  object that  can not  be eaten. 
IO. God has ceased to exist as a separate object. 
N u m b e r  I is a neutral  s tatement  of fact which relates an event, 
the occurrence of which can be established by observations and the 
reports of  witnesses in a way that  is independent  of religious con- 
victions. (Transferring Hume 's  anecdote to the realm of  factual 
s I b i d . ,  p. 343. 
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statements about the past does not affect the main issues under con- 
sideration here). Both 2 and 3 are religious statements which are 
affirmed by orthodox Catholics; the origin and truth of these state- 
ments are not under consideration here. And 4 is simply an explici- 
tation of part of the meaning of the English word "eat" and is an 
undeniable truism, whenever that word is understood literally. Here 
it serves to explicitate the non-metaphorical character of the notion 
of eating that is used in the anecdote. Like 2 and 3, 5 is a statement 
of orthodox Catholic belief, though it is also asserted by non- 
Catholic Christians, Muslims, and deists (and perhaps by Hume 
himself). 
Both 6 and 7 are statements derived from the notion of God that is 
shared by these same groups but that is not explicitated in the anec- 
dote. They are minimal statements that assert only what is relevant 
to the point of the story; no effort is made here to derive them from 5 
or to explicitate the notion of God in any greater detail. Number 7 
can be derived from the conjunction of 4 and 6. Statement 8 is (at 
least in Hume's view) a consequence of I, 2, and 3; this point will 
require further discussion. Number 9 is a consequence of 7 and 8 
and makes explicit the essential absurdity of the doctrine under 
attack. Finally, IO is a restatement of Mustapha's own conclusion 
and is a consequence of 4, 5, and 8. 
These statements can be formalized into a valid argument, but 
such a procedure would not dispose of the difficulties which the 
orthodox Catholic would bring against this line of argument. These 
difficulties would center around the use of 4 and the move from 
i, 2, and 3 to 8. As has been pointed out, 4 is an explicitation of 
our ordinary notion of "eating". But the interpretation of the 
expression "to eat the body" in Catholic doctrine and practice is 
obviously against allowing premises of this type to be used in the 
argument. 
A quotation from the eucharistic hymn of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Lauda Sion, will suffice to show the willing acceptance of the para- 
doxes that result from the prohibition of inferences employing a 
literal understanding of terms from ordinary language: "His body 
is our food, His blood our drink. And yet Christ remains entire 
under each species. The communicant receives the complete Christ 
- uncut, unbroken and undivided. Whether one receive or a thou- 
sand, the one receives as much as the thousand. Nor is Christ con- 
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sumed by being received. ''6 In general it may be said that orthodox 
theology has shown considerable selectivity in the inferences that it 
allows to be drawn from a literal understanding of the terms it bor- 
rows from ordinary language. 
A somewhat similar difficulty can be found in the inference from 
i, 2, and 3 to 8. In the New Testament accounts of the institution of 
the Eucharist, Jesus is represented as commanding his disciples to 
eat his body, but  not to "eat God". These narratives and the dis- 
course in chapter 6 of John  have set the pattern for CathoIic lin- 
guistic usage in this matter. Adherence to this usage is, however, 
more than merely a matter of preserving a traditional expression; 
it is also the result of the reflection oi1 the constitution of Jesus Christ 
found in the controversies of the early church, which resulted in the 
doctrine of the hypostatic union of two natures in one divine person 
and so prevented any simple equating of the body of Christ with the 
divine nature. Without  such an equation, it is not possible to make 
the move from i, 2, and 3 to 8. Within the linguistic rules laid down 
by the Christian community, one moves to the following statement: 
8a. Mustapha ate the body of Christ. 
Nor is this simply a question of adhering to linguistic rules in 
making statements about the Eucharist; the devotional attitudes 
and practices differ in accordance with the linguistic rules. The 
history of Catholic eucharistic piety seems to show an inverse rela- 
tionship between adoration of the divine presence in the Eucharist 
and receiving the body of Christ in communion. 
Now, when one replaces 8 by 8a or else reduces the meaning of 8 
to that of 8a, one is in a position to repudiate 9 and IO, which are 
dependent on 8, even while the paradoxes of the Lauda Sion are ac- 
cepted as expressions of the "mystery" of the Eucharist. In the 
Catholic theological tradition, then, it is possible to assert that bread 
becomes the body of Christ and that what is eaten is not consumed, 
but  it is not possible to say that the believer can eat the spiritual and 
eternal God. Yet all these statements, both the licit and the illicit, 
are bound to strike the Humean  bystander as absurd. The restric- 
tion of inferences based on the literal meaning of terms used in ordi- 
nary language is especially arbitrary and unsatisfactory, because it 
6 St. Thomas Aquinas, Lauda Sion, in Hymns of the Roman Liturgy, tr. and ed. Rev. Joseph 
Connelly (Westminster, Md.: Newman, I957) , p. i~6. 
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is precisely these inferences, which deal with what we know best, 
that should be soundest. 7 
The general situation may be stated thus: the upholders of tradi- 
tional religious views stand accused of making claims which, on any 
careful and honest examination, are not merely paradoxical but are 
self-contradictory and absurd. Their attempts to evade these con- 
tradictions are arbitrary and inconsistent. They insist on using terms 
taken from ordinary language but are unwilling to draw legitimate 
inferences from the statements they make with these terms. Their  
theological reasoning can scarcely be called reasoning at all, since 
it is subject to arbitrary prohibitions of those inferences that lead to 
unorthodox conclusions, that is, to those conclusions that they are 
unwilling to accept. In this case, although they claim that Christ is 
really present in the consecrated host and anathematize those who 
would maintain a merely symbolic presence of Christ, they are un- 
willing to abide by the consequences of this claim, which, indeed, 
"eludes the force of all argument".  Unwillingness to abandon this 
absurd claim can only be put down to the general unwillingness of 
men to follow the light of reason and to abandon religious folly, 
especially when such folly is sanctioned by tradition. 
Such a line of argument, which is implicit in sections i I and 12 
of the Natural History of Religion, is, when thus generalized, just as 
applicable to the orthodox Protestantism with which Hume was 
familiar as it is to Catholicism; for orthodox Protestant theology is 
bound to run into comparable difficulties in its Trinitarian and 
Christological doctrines. The general question that is being raised 
here is that of the existence and determination of acceptable deci- 
sion procedures for evaluating the truth-claims of what Hume 
termed popular theism, by which he meant  that form of religious 
belief that, not content with the conclusions of philosophical theism 
(which were, for Hume, quite limited), goes beyond them to make 
doctrinal affirmations about revealed "mysteries". More specifically, 
it deals with the problem of setting up procedures for determining 
the validity of inferences within a given theological system. I f  in- 
ferences that are acceptable in ordinary language are rejected be- 
cause they contradict the basic propositions of the system, can intel- 
Cf. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: Social Sciences, i948), p. *44. 
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lectually honest procedures be established to control theological 
inferences ? 
The problems which this line of argument presents may seem to 
be no more than the carpings of an unsympathetic rationalistic by- 
stander, who is unwilling to enter into the spirit of faith and makes 
no effort to grasp the peculiar logic of religious discourse. "Will you 
set profane reason against sacred mystery? No punishment is too 
great for your impiety. ''8 But, as Hume himself points out, these 
same difficulties can be found within the Christiar~ religious tradi- 
tion; for, in his view, those Christians who have been branded as 
heretics are precisely those who have been on the side of reason and 
who have tried to control their theological conclusions by some form 
of rational procedure. 9 Is the rejection of their inferences and con- 
clusions anything more than the tr iumph of irrationality? Further- 
more, Hume's original story suggests that the belief-system under 
scrutiny (Roman Catholicism) is self-contradictory and that rela- 
tively simple inferences suffice to expose at least some of the contra- 
dictions of the system. If  this is the case, then the believer must either 
abandon the principle of contradiction and with it any effort to 
build a coherent doctrinal structure or to make serious truth-claims, 
or he must modify his original propositions so that they will not be 
contradictory. (Hume also pointed out that comparable difficulties 
confront the philosophical theologian in drawing inferences from 
the order of the visible universe.) 1~ 
What account, then, can be given of rules for allowing or dis- 
allowing theological inferences of the type discussed in our original 
example, that is, inferences which use the implications of terms in 
ordinary language to arrive at theological conclusions? Various 
rules have been proposed, of which three may be briefly considered: 
I) a written rule of faith (in this case, the Bible); 2) the common 
agreement of the believing community; 3) a visible teaching author- 
ity empowered to lay down and interpret general and specific rules 
to guide theological reasoning. The first alternative runs into three 
major difficulties, the last two of which have been severely aggra- 
vated by modern historical scholarship. First, the written rule of 
s H u m e ,  Natural History, p. 342.  
9 Ibid. 
10 H u m e ,  Dialogues, p p .  I 6 5 - I 6 9 .  
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faith is not self-interpreting but  requires interpretation and applica- 
tion. Even if only those theological sentences are to be allowed 
which are found in the written rule (this would be the strictest sort 
of fundamentalism and would mean the death of creative theology), 
it would be necessary to determine whether a given sentence was 
identical with one of the allowed sentences. As translators are aware, 
this is not so simple as it sounds. Determination of the identity of 
two theological propositions would be more difficult still, and estab- 
lishing the general "conformity" of theological sentences to the 
written rule would be a task of still greater difficulty. Second, if the 
written rule is even remotely comparable in complexity and internal 
differentiation to the Bible or even to the New Testament, it cannot 
be assumed that all sentences in the written rule are non-contra- 
dictory; in fact, there are very good reasons for thinking that the 
Bible contains Contradictory sentences. Third, it is not possible to 
derive the statements of Christian theology from the Bible alone; 
doctrinal affirmations, at least from the time of Nicea on, have been 
made in non-Biblical terminology, the precise relationship of which 
to Biblical sentences is frequently ambiguous. 
The next two proposals for coping with this problem of rules are 
both extrinsic solutions. While they can both provide the inquirer 
with publicly ascertainable statements about  the legitimacy or truth 
of particular theological inferences (the second can do this more 
easily than the first), the problem still remains of determining what 
their own rule for governing inferences is. The problem has been 
relocated, not resolved. Any further account of the basic decision 
procedure seems to involve a privileged access to the religious reali- 
ties under consideration either for the religious community or for its 
leaders and teachers; it is also likely to involve art increased em- 
phasis on the character of the community as itself a sacred reality 
not subject in any final or decisive way to profane scrutiny. 11 
An illustration of this type of account can be found in the fol- 
lowing remarks of the fourth-century Greek theologian, St. Gregory 
of Nyssa, on the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in his Catechetical 
Oration : 
11 For an  illustration of this tendency in contemporary  Catholicism, consult  Vat ican I I ' s  
Dogmat ic  Const i tut ion on the  Church ,  Lumen Gentium, especially nos. 4, 22, and  25, in 
The  Documents  of  Vat ican  II,  ed. Wal ter  M. Abbot t  (New York: Guild Press, I966), 
pp. 17, 42-44,  47-5o. 
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The result is that he who attentively scrutinizes the depths of 
the mystery receives in his spirit by a secret intuition a very 
fair degree of comprehension of  the doctrine relating to the 
knowledge of God, even though he cannot express clearly in 
speech the ineffable depth of this mystery, how the same 
thing admits of being numbered and yet escapes numeration; 
is perceived in a way that involves division and yet is appre- 
hended as a unity; is distinct as regards person, and not 
divided as regards underlying essence. 12 
Here the use of inferences from ordinary language, a subject on 
which Gregory makes a number of remarks elsewhere in this same 
treatise, la is to be controlled by reference to a privileged intuition 
which the believer possesses and yet which presents difficulties of 
interpretation and requires careful scrutiny. The situation supposed 
here in some way resembles that of a person who has had a dream 
or an extraordinary sense experience for which there do not exist 
readily available descriptions in ordinary language. Such a person 
will commonly use the terms and conventions of ordinary language 
to describe and to suggest to us the content of his experience, and 
we recognize the value and legitimacy of this kind of talk, even 
though the person would deny at least some of the inferences that 
would normally be appropriate in ordinary language. We do not, 
however, regard his statements as correct or normative accounts of 
common objects of belief and concern. Comparison of such de- 
scriptions of personal experiences with the statements of religious 
believers will show that there remain considerable differences be- 
tween them. Normally the believer who makes statements like 2 or 3 
in our original example is not giving a report of his personal expe- 
riences, even though some believers may (and probably do) have 
experiences that prompt  them to make such statements. The be- 
liever and the theologian are making statements that they expect to 
be subscribed to by an indeterminately large community which is 
not defined, at least explicitly, by such a shared private experience. 
But if the believer or the theologian appeals to a special intuition of 
12 St. Gregory of Nyssa, Catechetical Oration, tr. J. H. Strawley (London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge, I917), p. 31. 
~3 Ibid., pp. ~6-27, 54, 55" 
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the type described by St. Gregory, he cannot expect others to sub- 
scribe to his statements unless they share such an intuition or unless 
they are prepared, with or without reason, to accept his authority as 
a witness of that intuition. Also, it is far from clear just how it is 
possible to have intuitions of the sorts of things described in Chris- 
tian theological statements or how such intuitions can be given 
appropriate linguistic expression. 
A fourth possibility remains, however, which should be indicated, 
for it is a point at which "popular religion" makes contact with 
"philosophical" religion and it also returns us to our original ex- 
ample. This last possibility is the elaboration of rules of inference on 
the basis of a prior metaphysical analysis of the realities under con- 
sideration. It  states that only those ordinary language inferences 
from the basic theological propositions are to be allowed which are 
compatible with the nature of the realities under consideration. 
A good illustration of such an effort to use a metaphysical doctrine 
to control ordinary language inferences can be found in the Eucha- 
ristic teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas in his use of the central notion 
of transubstantiation. 14 This control of ordinary language inferences 
is an important aspect of the Catholic effort to forestall a superstitious 
understanding of the real presence; John Macquarrie observes that 
the doctrine of transubstantiation "is in fact one of the strongest 
possible safeguards against magical views. ''15 
Clearly, such a move is legitimate if and only if it is possible to 
have knowledge of the divine nature independently of the state, 
merits that are to be controlled. The possibility of arriving at meta- 
physical knowledge of a type that can perform this regulative 
function with regard to theological statements is an issue for the 
theory of knowledge; the success, adequacy, or consistency with 
which such regulation of inferences is carried out is an integral part  
of systematic theological argument;  consideration of either problem 
exceeds the scope of this paper on the analysis of religious language. 
14 For an  exceptionally clear illustration of this, see T h o m a s  Aquinas ,  Summa Theologiae, 
I I I ,  q. 75, art. 8, " U t r u m  haec sit vera, 'ex pane  fit corpus Chris t i ' "  (Is this proposition 
true, " T h e  body of Christ  comes from the bread?") .  For a historical t rea tment  of  some 
of the  problems presented by the  relation of the  metaphysical  notion of t ransubstant ia-  
tion to the  original faith affirmation of the real presence of Christ  in the Eucharis t ,  con- 
suit  J ames  McCue,  " T h e  Doctrine of Transubs tan t ia t ion  from Berengar th rough  Tren t , "  
Harvard Theological Review, 6I (i968), pp.  385-43 o. 
15 J o h n  Macquarr ie ,  Principles of Christian Theology (New York: Scribner 's,  i966), p. 425. 
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But it may be profitable to point out some of the consequences of 
this proposal for metaphysical control of theological inferences. 
First, this proposal raises again the specter of the corruption of 
philosophy by superstition which so pained and angered Hume. 1G 
But it may fairly be said that the very limited conclusions that Hume 
was prepared to accept about the supreme Beipg left him without 
principles that could be employed in controlling theological dis- 
course and so led him to an overly sharp distinction between philo- 
sophical and popular religion which left no room for the work of 
metaphysical or philosophical theology. Once the effort to move 
beyond a naive, popular view of the Eucharist to an ordered and 
consistent understanding of the Eucharist by the use of philosophical 
categories is ruled out, then the original doctrine is left exposed in 
its absurdity. But such a conclusion does serious injustice to the in- 
tent, at least, of systematic theologians and does little to illuminate 
the nature of their activity, which cannot properly be identified 
with either philosophical or popular religion in Hume's sense. 
Second, this proposal obviously presupposes the possibility of 
making serious faith affirmations such as 2 and 3 in the original 
example, and does not concern itself with the problem of justifying 
such affirmations. It does, however, suggest a means of proceeding 
in the explication of the content of such affirmations as well as a 
means of defending them against the charge of superstition. 
Third, the proposal does not resolve the question of which sen- 
tences are to be treated in this way. The method proposed is one 
fitted for the explication of religious propositions that have some 
claim to be taken literally, e.g., the Catholic claim that the host 
really is the body of Christ. But which statements state such proposi- 
tions is matter for the prior judgment  of believers; and the task of 
determining what sentences have been used to state such proposi- 
tions in Scripture or in the history of the religious community is 
matter  for exegetical and historical inquiry. 
Fourth, if the objection is raised that adopting this procedure is a 
desperate expedient intended to rescue religious discourse from its 
all too obvious absurdities, it should be realized that the procedure, 
despite its conservative character, offers no guaranteed outcome. In 
the application of this procedure to particular doctrinal or creedal 
18 H u m e ,  Natural History, p. 34 t.  Cf. also pp .  362-363  . 
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affirmations, it may become clear that the religious affirmations to 
be controlled and clarified by this procedure fail to meet either 
logical or empirical criteria of acceptability or that they conflict 
with the metaphysical principles being used. In either case, various 
moves are possible: one may reject the religious affirmation as false; 
one may reinterpret it as metaphorical; one may modify one's em- 
pirical beliefs or logical or metaphysical principles; one may suspend 
judgment  or appeal to the notion of"mystery" ; one may try to revise 
the content of the original affirmation. The point is that many 
moves are possible - some orthodox, some not, no one of them neces- 
sary. The judgment  of the appropriateness of a given move wilI have 
to depend on careful consideration of all the factors in a particular 
theological quandary.  Certainly, ill the case of the scholastic effort 
to wed Hebraic and Christian religious affirmations with the prin- 
ciples of Platonic, Aristotelian, and neo-Platonic metaphysics, there 
can be no initial guarantee of a successful outcome. In any case, the 
riskiness of the outcome is, one may surmise, a prime reason for the 
long-standing suspicion and distrust that some believers and theo- 
logians have felt toward philosophy and philosophical theology. 
Fifth, it should be noted that the adoption of this procedure on an 
official basis (as has generally been the case in Roman Catholicism) 
leads to the creation of a division between two ways of under- 
standing religious statements. The first is a simple literalism which 
adheres to traditional religious formulations. This literalism may 
slide into unorthodox or superstitious expressions of the original 
faith affirmation; or, content not to probe too deeply or to range too 
widely, it may persist in a dogged fidelity to what  it has received. 
The second course is a sophisticated and frequently highly technical 
understanding of religious affirmations and a careful discrimination 
of permissible and impermissible theological statements. These can 
only be appropriated by religious professionals, who until recently 
were nearly all members of the clergy, though some of the conclu- 
sions of this procedure could be and were communicated to simple 
believers in catechetical instructions and sermons. (A great deal of 
Catholic religious instruction was until recently dominated by the 
effort to impart such conclusions rather than by the effort to re- 
create the existential basis for the original faith affirmations.) 
Finally, it should be pointed out that this method of controlling 
inferences from religious statements and analogies is bound to set up 
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a tension between the need to restrict the implications of meta- 
phorical religious language for the sake of consistency with meta- 
physical principles and the desire to exploit the poetic and vital 
connotations of such language. I f  this tension within the religious 
communi ty  is undone by the unquestioned dominance of the meta- 
physical principles, the communi ty  runs the risk of stifling religious 
imagination or diverting it to areas that  are peripheral to the great 
religious issues. 
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